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The large expansion of government powers in some of the Western countres  in the
post World War II period was given theoretical backdng  by the theory of market failure, and
the achievements of the studies of externalities, public goods, and optimal taxation. Many of
these studies have found their way into the analysis of economic development issues. During
the 1980s, these theories, or at least their applications in the public debate, have been justly
criticized for their lack of attention to government failures. Moreover, in recent years
government intervention in the economy has come to be regarded with more suspicion than
in the past and an increasing number of policymakers in countries as different as Argentina,
Mexico, China or Hungary have adopted a more pragmatic approach to development favoring
reliance on the market to allocate goods and service.
The theoretical intuition behind the superiority of market allocation is wel  known.
Given the efficiency of market exchanges, agents should be left to make as many decisions
for themselves as possible. When these decisions are transferred to the public sector, there
are asymmetries of information and the associated opportunities for rent seeking actvities,
and the loss of efficiency may be large enough for even the poorest members, who are
supposed to benefit from these policies, to lose out
These insights have been transfered to the orgnization  of the public sector itself. if
political economy teaches us that as many decisions as possible should be decentalized
through the market, doesn't it follow that within the public sector deisions  should also be
decentralized as much as is feasible?  What one cannot leave to private initiative should be
2left to the lowest possible level of government.
Things are not that simple  because  these policy  insights  are based on a very
unbalanced  theoretical  underpinning.  Economists  have a good theory  of the functioning  of
markets,  their benefits  and their failures.  Our understanding  of govemments  and of public
administration  is much more  imperfect,  in great part because  the topic is more difficult.
When  one compares  markets  to public provision,  one compares  something  understood
relatively  well to something  one does not understand  very well at all. The situation  is even
more complex  when one wants to compare  two types  of public  provision,  for instance  a very
centralized  government  with a federation  that leaves much  power to local units. One
compares  two situations  of which neither  is understood  very well.
We believe  that improvements  in the analytical  treatment  of the iternal  functioning
and of the optimal  structure  of government  should  be accessible  through  the tansfer of the
intuitions  developed  in the theory of the firm in the last twenty  years. Some  work bas been
done on this topic, but much more can be done. In particular,  the very important  advances  of
contract  theory in the last ten years have  not been adequately  integrated  into the discussion.
The aim of this paper is to open channels  of thoughts  along these lines, with a special
emphasis  on the provision  of infrastructure.  This is not to imply  that results from the theory
of the firm can be directly imported. The public sector has very specific fears,  some of
which will be discussed  below. What  can be imported  are intuitions  and tchniques for the
study  of organizational  problems.  Furthermore,  normative  issues  are of much greater
importance  in the choice  of optimal  policies  dta  appears  from the summary  that follows,  and
we neglect  them for the major  part of the sequel.
3The paper is organized  as follows.  In section  2, we describe  a simple  model that lies,
at least implicidy, at the basis of much of recent policy  discussion.  In section  3, we enich
this model  through the use of contract  theory, as developed  in the 1970's and the begnning
of the 1980's. This enables  us to discuss  the problems  of transfers  among  jurisdictions  as
well as aspects  of financing.  In section  4, we discuss  the shortcomings  of these approaches
and show that recent developments  in contract  theory  and the theory of  ions
incomplete  contracts  and renegotiation  - provide  a natural  language  to speak of some of
these issues. The sequel  of the paper is used to develop  applications  of this methodology.  In
section  5 we try to provide some  preliminary  reflections  on the concept  of political
jurisdictions,  paralleling  the famous "nature of the finn"  debate  in organzation theory.
Finally, section  6 provides  a pot pourri of applications.
2. The received  wisdom  on decentralization
This section  summarizes  the received  wisdom  on decen  on  of responsiilities
for regulation  and provision  on goods  and services  in the standard  public economics
literatu.  It outlines  the key assumptions  underlying  the main  policy guidelines  of the
standard  public finance  literature  on fiscal federalism,  focusing  in particular  on those  that can
much more  easily be addressed  by relying on a contractual  approach  to the issues raised by
the structure  of government.
40<.f--;2.1  A Quick Sure
The standard  public finance  literature  provides  both ex-ante  and ex-post  arguments  for
decentmalization.  The classic  ex-ante case for decentralization  is provided  by Oates  in 1972.
He points out that public goods  can have spatial  characteristics  reflecting  the specific
boundaries-global,  regional  or local-of the benefits  they provide  to their consumers.  Oates'
decentralization  theoremn  suggests  that, for a given information  structure  about demands,  each
tyeof  good should  be provided  by a level of government  - say central, state and municipal-
-enjoying  a comparative  advantage  in accounting  for the diversity  of preferences  in its choice
of service  delivery.  Club theory provides  related arguments  to make  the case for an optimum
size of local authorities.
Based on these demand  elements  and on the recognition  tha spillovers  and other
forms of externalities  in production  and consumption  can matter, a 'standard  lst o
desirable  expenditure  assignments-in  terms of provision  and/or responsibility-provides  thec
basis of the policy guidelines  for countries  considering  a decnrliainof  government
structures.  For instance,  airways  and railways  should  be a central  concern  in view of the
national  scope of their benefits  and costs, while  provision  of services  in highways  could be
national,  state or local-reflecting  the balance  between  spillovers  and local preferences.
Where does the comparative  advantage  of the various  government  levels come from?
it reflects an assumed  government  failure. In one version, the failure stems  from an
informnation  asymmetry  between  central and subnational  governments.  Cenftral  governments
are assumed  to have some  institutional  disadvantage  in picking  up local information  on
5preferences.  More decentralized governments have better knowledge of local preferences,
either in the sense of having access to information denied to central government, or in the
sense of observing preferences with less noise. In a sMMod  version of the government failure
argument, the central government is assumed to be institutionally compelled to adopt a
uniformity constraint in service delivery. Even if it were able to identify the diversity of
demands across regions and municipalities, it could not diversify its supply accordingly.
These failures reveal the second best nature of the decentalization  argument.
The classic ex-post case for decentralization was made by Tiebout in  1956.  liebout's
point was that population mobility reinforces ex post the ex-ante case based on superior
information or flexibility of local government. This mobility should eventnlly  ensure a
perfect match between public sector supply and consumer preferences. Consumers vote with
their feet and move to the municipality or region which provides them with what they want
both in terns  of services and in terms of financing mix - taxes, user fees, etc. In sum, it
explains how jurisdictions of optimal size come to be established or how individuals take
membership in these "local clubs".
2.2  Shortcomings of the Tiebout approach
Since most analysts of fiscal federalism have used generalized versions of the liebout
model in which the incentives of the different districts are fundamentally linked to the abit
to attct  new inhabitants and/or new capital, it is worth focusing on some of its limiation
as a model of political decentralization in practice:
61)  Ihe role of the national  govemment  is not endogenous,  or rather it can only be
considered  as trying  to circumvent  the negative  aspects  of the competition  between
jurisdictions.
2)  The governments'  objectives  in the Tiebout  model  are assumed  to be profit
maximization  (see Bewley, 1981), without  any discussion  of how such objectives
might  aise  from a realistic  model of the political  process. The latter issue is generAly
only addressed  explicitly  in public choice  models.
3)  Government failures (including corruption) can arise at the subnational level
just as much as they arise at the central level.
4)  The actual mobility  of factors  is generally  much more limited  than assumed  by
Tiebout  and the effect  of positive  decisions  by the government  of one district  will
influence  the competitive  position  of the district  only in the long run. From an
empirical  point of view, as pointed out by Walsh  (1992), the main relevance  of the
model  is in a metropolitan  setting-i.e. within  suburbs  located  near other communides
and hence  with exit options  than in communities  with no or fewer exit options.
5)  Mobility  can give rise to externalities  which  are not accounted  for in the
design of the financing  mode  of the  jurisdiction.
6)  In practice,  politicians  often try to favor specific  interest groups in their
districts  (for instance,  US congressmen  will try to introduce  in the law tax breaks
designated  to favor specific  firms whose headquarters  are in their districts). Tiebout
theory would predict more stress on favoring  the transfer  of fators  of production  to
the district.
77)  Respnsibilities are actually  often shared  by various levels  of govemnment.  For
*  ~~~instance,  governments  must  decide  on aggregate  road expenditures  ini  a jurisdiction,
and on the allocfon  of this expenditure among different types of -ads.  The firt
decision  can be left to the federal  government  and the second  to the local government.
Similarly,  the federal  government  can set pollution  standards,  and the local
government  can be in charge  of monitoring  their implementation  (see Estache  and
Zheng (1992)  and (1993)  and Jack (1992)).  The difficulty  in the study  of this
rLesponisibility  sharing mechanism  stems from the modelling  of the incentives  of the
different levels of governments.
In addition  to appreciating  the particular  shortcomings  of the Tiebout  framework,  it is
importat to appreciate  what the underlying  approach  can and cannot  be expected  to achieve.
Tiebout's basic insight was that population  mobility  can enable  governments  to overcome  the
well-known  problem  of inducing  citizens  to reveal their  preferences  for public goods. This
problem  arises if governments  have no way to exclude  from consumption  those citizens  who
state that they would prefer not to pay for the provision  of a certain  public good. If goods
are "local  *, however, they can be provided  only for the citizens  of a given local  jurisdiction
(together  with a local tax), thereby  exclucing  from consumption  all iion-residents  and
allowing  citizens  in their choice  of residence  to select their  preferred combination  of public
goods. In the limit, when mobility  is costless  and various other technical  conditions  are
satisfied,  the public goods problem  disappears  and the allocation  of resources  is efficient.
The TLiebout  approach  has nothing  to say, however,  about how the appropriate  local
'_  Hr  '~~~~~~~~~bundles  of public  goods might  come  to be established.  This might, of course, happen  as the
result of spirited  competiton between  independent  local govemments  (though  to do so they
would  have to be profit maximizing,  and it is far from clear how such  a go;l might emerge
from any plausible  political  process). But there is no reason  in principle  why a central
government  could not also put the Tiebout  insight to use, and differentiate  its supply  of
public  goods by locality  in order to induce  the revelation  of preferences.  In short, the
Tiebout  model  describes  the virtues of local differentiadon  of public  goods supply, not the
virtues  of decentralization  of power. In order to understand  the pros and cons of
decentrdlization  as such, it therefore  needs sapplementing  by an account  of the respective
abilities  of centra and local governments  to undertake  the kind of local differentiation  whose
virtues the Tiebout  model has described.
Such an account  would  return us essentially  to the ex an  approach  to
decentrlization.  Underlying many scholarly as well as popular accounts of  ntralization  is
a view of the essential  informational  advantages  of local government,  and an implicit  model
with the following  elements':
1) A oDuntry  is divided  into n districts,  and there are no other political  divisions,
either above the district or below it.
2) Each district has a local government  which has knowledge  of the relevant
characteristics  of that district.
3) Each local government  takes decisions  in the interest of its own disktict,  without
A model  with  the  some  of  the  features  discussed  below  in  presented  in  Do
Groot  (1988).
9takng into account  the desires  of other districts  except  if this is imposed  by the
federal  government.
4) There is a centra government  that takes  decisions  in the interest of the country  as
a whole (whatever  exactly  this may mean).
5) The central government  knows  only the average  of the characteristics  of the
districts. Consequently  it can do no better than implement  a uniform  package  of
public goods  for all districte
For each issue, the power to take decisions  is given either to the central governmenit
or to the local governments.  The types of issue  that we have in mind are the levels of
expenditure  on elementary  education,  pollution  standards,  the mileage  of new roads to be
built.
Such a model  yields  results that are quite close to the 'common' wisdom  on
decentralization:  there is a fundamental  tradeoff  between  decisions  tha are more appropriate
to local conditions  and the internalization  of externaities. There are of course other benefits
from coordinated  decisions  than simply the internalization  of externalities:  those  due to the
exploitation  of increasing  returns, for instance.
The drawback  of the model, however,  is that it leaves the informational  advantage  of
local government  essentially  unexplained.  To explore  this issue further we turn to a
2  This  inference  is  not  correct  in  a  dynamic  model  in  which  the  central.
government,  while  initially  uninformed,  experimentu  with  differentiated  public
good  supply  and  thereby  learns  about  the  dif  ferent  characteriotics  of  the
districts.  This  would  be  similar  to  a  tatonnement  proceus  in  Walrasian  modeim.
We  are  not  aware  of  such  a  dynamic  model  explicitly  developed  in  the  public
finance  literature.
10discussion  of the implications  of recent developments  in contract  treory.
3.  A simple  contract  model  of decentralizadon
In this section,  we revisit  the preceding  model  with the help  of a  simple  ontactual
approach. This allows  us to enrich  the description  of the communicadons  between  federl
and local governments.  We  begin by a brief exposition  of revelation  contracts,  and apply the
insights  to the problem  of decentralization.
3.1  Asymmetry of information and contracts
It is hard to overestimate  the revolution  that took  place  at the begining  of the 1970s  in
economic  theory. For a long  time,  economists  had talked  informally  about  the strategic  use
of information  (see for instance  the famous  planning  debate  of the 1930's  betwe  Hayek  and
Lange  (1938)),  but it was not until over thirty  years  later that the strategic  use of inhrmation
wa-s  for the first time formally  integrated  into our mrodels.  This revolution  changed  our
understanding  of markets  (following  the path breaking  contributions  of Akerlof  (1970)  and
Spence  (1973))  and of incentives  in organizations  (following  the no less path  breaking
contribudons  of Groves  (1973)  and Weitzman  (1974)).
The basic  framework  is very simple.  A fedeal government  wants  a municipality  to
build  a sewage  system  in a poor neighborhood.  It has no administative  power  to force  it to
do so, and must  offer a cost sharing  formula.  Typically,  this formula  wil be part of a
- ~~~~~~~11F.-
contract that linls  the amount paid by the federal go.ernment  to the charcteistics  of the
sewage  system  that is built. If the costs of building  the sewage  system  are better known  to
the local government  than to the federal  govemment,  the former will be able to extract an
informational  rent. This informational  rent is not only a transfer from one government  level
to another,  it has efficiency  costs: it order to reduce  it the federal  goveniment  will build a
cost sharing  formula  that will induce  the local government  to choose  a system that is not
optimally  dimensioned.
It is possible  to show that the federal  government  of our example  never looses
anything by offering a contract of the following form: "Tell me everything you know that is
relevant  to the estimate  of cost. As a function  of what you tell me I will, according  to a
predetermined  formula, transfer  funds to you and order you to build a system  of
predetermined  characteistics".
Furthermore,  it is possible  to choose  a contract  such that the local government  wil
truthfully  reveal its information.  The equivalence  of any cost sharing  formula  to one of these
"revelation  mechanisms"  in which the informed  party is given incentives  to announce  its
information  truthfully, is called  the revelation  principle.
The intuition  behind  this principle  is that, given any initial  contact, the federal
government  can calculate  under what circumstances  the local government  would have
incentives  to misreport  its information.  It can then modify  the contract  so as to increase  the
tansfers to which the local government  would  be eligible  under  these cicumstnces,  so as to
leave  it no worse off if it tells the truth. The increased  tranfers which it must therefore
implement  are a necessary  cost of the initial  asymmetry  of information,  and cannot  be
12reduced  by any  strategic  manipulation.  The  validity  of the  principle  depends,  however,  on
the  assumption  that  the  federal  government  knows  enough  about  the  payoffs  of the local
government  to calculate  its incentives  for lying;  even more  importantly,  it depends  on the
assumption  that  it has no difficulty  committing  itself to a truth-inducing  contract.  We shall
discuss  the limitations  of these  assumptions  below,  but shall  concentrate  for the moment  on
the  theory's  strengths.
Many  variations  on this theme  are  possible,  of which  one is specially  relevant  to our
purposes.  The  revelation  principle  can easily  be adapted  to a situation  where  the  construction
of the sewage  system  extends  over  a long  period  of time  and  where  the  information  becomes
available  to the local  government  progressively.  Then,  any contract  between  the two  parties
is equivalent  to a contract  in which  the  local government  informs  the  federal  government  as
soon  as information  becomes  available.
The  fact  chat  any  contract  is equivalent  to a revelaton  mechanismn  is an extremely
useful  technical  tool. It also  brings  out  in very  stark  form  the limnitations  of the  theory.  The
Constitution  of the United  States  can  be considered  the founding  contract  of tha country.
Using  contract:  theory  to analyze  the  present,  one would  need  to assume  (implicitly)  that  the
Founding  Fathers  had  foreseen  present  conditions  as one of the contingencies  in the conftact
they  drew  up.
13In light of contract theory, the basic model  tha we have sketched  above can be
substanti-ally  modified.  There is no reason to assume  that the federa government  will accept
the fact that the infornnation  of the local government  is niot  accessible.  It can propose
contracts  (implicit  or explicit)  that ask the local governments  to reveal their information  and
commit  it to some  actions  as a function  of this information.  All the appartats of contract
theory can be used to study the end resulL
A revelation  mechanism  need not only be interpreted  as a contract signed  between  the
federal  government  and the local governments.  It can also be thought  of as a system  of
taxation,  where the tax is levied  according  to the observable  actions  and characteristics  of the
distri'ct.  The same fundamental  trade-off  will be involved:  efficiency  requires large
informational  rents to the more fortunate  districts.  This makes  a very sftrog cas  for
perormncebased  grants, though  it also underlines  that such grants may conflict  with
considerations  of equity.  The informational  rents will not necessarily  be allocated  according
to any nornatively  justifiable  formula.
In order to limit informational  rents, the federal  government  will find it desimable  to
accept inefficiencies.  The service  that the district  provide  will not be priced in such a way
that marginal  cost is equal to its social  marginal  -value.  It will only be for these  districts  who
are the most efficient  at providing  the service  that the equality  will hold.
An example  may help. In a country  in which  the federal  government  sucnrcsto
the local governments  maintenanice  of the roads, the latter would try to exploit  their spro
14knowledge  of local technical  conditions  and of the taste of the local population.  They would
have a tendency  to overstate  costs and benefits  of additional  maintenance.  The theory tells us
tha they will be able to reap some  advantage  from this superior  knowledge.  Furthermore,  in
order to limit this advantage  the federal  government  will accept  tha some inefficiencies  creep
into the system,  and the direction  of these  inefficiencies  can be predicted:  there will be too
litte  maintenance.
The rigour and clarity of the theory  of revelation  mechanisms  has an associated  cost.
By appearing  to suggest  that a central government  can, if it wishes, overcome  the
informational advantages of local govemnment,  it undermines the entire basis of  nt  Tade-off
between information-gatheTing  and the interalization  of extemnalities  that constituted the
conventional wisdom as we characterized it in section 2. The conclusion might appear to be
dat centralization is always to be preferred to decentralization, but in fact te  subveion  of
the traditional approach goes further than that. For if a central govemrment  can sign contra
with local governments,  what is to prevent local governments  from signing  contracts  with
each other without the intermediation of a central authority at all?
3.3  -Why do we need a central  government  in order to internalize externalities?
irt  management of river basins represents a typical example of decisions that one
should expect to leave to levels above the local level (assuming, of course,  ttat,  as is usually
the case, the river flows through many localities). Indeed there are strong  xteract  with
the upstream localities able literally to dump their tash  on the downstream localities. If this
15is the case, why can't  the externality be resolved through direct negotiations between the
localities themselves?
More generally, the conventional wisdom has generally assumed that we need an
authority that can order subordinate units to limit negative externalities, or encourage them to
produce more positive extemalities. There is no explanation of why we cannot apply a
version of the reasoning in the Coase theorem, which states that in the absence of negotiation
costs, bargaining will lead to optimal outcomes. One may acknowledge that the Coase
theorem is more seductive at the theoretical level than as guide to reality, and one cannot
expect a totally satisfactory solution to this problem. However, without at least some thought
given to the discrepancy between theoretical and practical intuition, it is difficult to provide
guidelines on the circumstances in which it would be better to let districts negotiate between
each other (see Gatsios & Seabright, 1989, and Jack, 1992, for discussions of this point).
So far, then, the application of contract theory to the analysis of decenalization  has
yielded a somewhat nihilistic conclusion. Not only has it shown that the supposed advantages
of decentralization are not really advantages; it has also shown that the supposed
disadvantages of decentralization are not really disadvantages. In consequence, without
further refinement it implicitly makes it impossible to discuss the allocation of rerponsibilities
among the different levels of government at all. For example, the literature contains
arguments for the decentralizatori of secondary schools to local governments as well as
arguments why it should be run at a regional or national level. How would we use standard
contract theory to study these two situations? In both cases, contracts, implicit or explicit,
would be signed, and some parties would benefit from informational rents due to their
16superior "time and place" knowledge.  There would  really be no reason  to have very
different  outcomes  in one case and the other. Even if the objectives  of the regional  and the
local governments  were different,  they would  presumably  be drawn  to bargain  together  in
such a way that the terms of the contract  would represent  both of their objective  functions.
The main difference  would be in the identification  of the party responsible  for paying the
informational  rents to the other.
The implication  of this reasoning  is that studying  the imperfections  of contratual
bargaining  is not just the result of a pedantic  desire  for a baroque  modelling  strategy.  On the
contrary, it is absolutely  central to understanding  the strengths  and weaknesses  of
decentralization  in government.  If contratual bargaining  worked  -perfectly,  the extent of
decentralization  in government  would be an irrelevance.  In section  4, therefore,  we discuss
three important  aspects  of the imperfections  of contractual  bargaining  that are of particular
importance:  the endogeneity  of information  acquisition,  the incompleteness  of contract, and
the possibility.of renegotiation.
4.  Contract  theory with imperfections  in bargaining
4.1  Th'e  endogeneity  of information  acquisition
Both the conventional  wisom  on decentralization  and first-generation  contract  theory
treated the allocation of information as exogeneous to the model. In reality the information
possessed by agents depends on the cost of acquiring it and the cost of processing it, and
17therefore  on the incentives  that they have  to incur these costs. A good allocation  of
responsibilities  should  give the proper incentives  to agents to incur these costs
For instance,  the control  of politicians  by the electorate  depends  crucially  on the
information  that the electors  have on the performance  of the different  government  entities  to
which they belong. As we discuss  below, the allocation  of responsibilities  among  levels  of
government  affects  this acquisition  of information,  by increasing  the value of the information
to voters in their efforts  to control  politicians.
The neglect  of this point can also lead to underestimadon  of the cost of cidzen
participation  in the running  of government  and can lead to recommendations  for the creation
of overly complicated  administrative  structures,  with each  citizen  belonging  to a multiplicity
of districts,  one by each type of public good.
Closer  attention  to the endogeneity  of information  acquisition  is the first step in
understanding  whether  and to what extent local  jurisdictions  enjoy any kind of informatonal
advantage  over central ones. Let us begin with an example.  Should  a public tstation
system  in a provincial  city be run by a local agency  or by a branch of a national  agency?  The
received  wisdom  would answer that it should. Externalities  between  cities are negligible,  and
hence  the informational  advantages  of proximity  dominate.  Upon reflection  though,  it is
difficult  to understand  what these  informational  advantages  are. A national  transportation
agency  could and presumably  would employ  representatives  living  in the city, who would
have access  to the same  sources  of information  as the representatives  of a local agency.
There seem to be two common  reasons  why local authorities  are assumed  to be better
informed  about local conditions  than national  ones. First, there is direct observation.  Because
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local politicians  and civil  servants  live in the district,  they have  direct  access  to information
(quality  of service,  traffic problems)  which  is not available  to individuals  who live far away.
Furthermore,  the information  that they do not gather directly  can easily  be provided  by
acquaintances,  family  members,  or simple  citizens  who have  easy access  to them. Second,
there are formal  mechanisms.  Governments  often  put in place  formal  procedures  through
which  they collect  information  from their constituents:  consultative  assemblies,  public
hearings,  advisory  boards.
If local governments  indeed  have  better  information  than cental governments,  it must
be either  because  some  of these  techniques  are available  to them  and not to the central
goverment,  or because  they have  better  incentives  to use them.  However,  it is clear that there
is no reason  why central  government  cannot  use any of the techniques  available  to local
government.  Central  governments  do nqame  representatives  to local  areas who collect
inforrnation  on their  behalf  (for instance,  the French  prefets);  and they do use mechanisms  by
which  citizens  of a local area can express  their  views  and provide  information.
If anything,  the balance  of advantage  as far as the availability  of infonnation
gathering  techniques  !  concerned  probably  lies with centrl government.  There  are
economies  of scope  in the collection  of information:  a central  agency  which  runs many
trnsportation systems  can transfer  techniques  acquired-  in one of them to the others at low
cost; it can  also afford to hire technicians  in more  specialized  areas an  can  a local agency.
If central  governments  do not in fact use the techniques  available  to them as
assiduously  as local governments  (a matter  on which empirical  evidence  is unclear  and which
will differ according  to the type  of information  in question),  this must  be because  they have
19less incentive to use them. 3 In the city transportation case, it will be because local
politicians, who live among and are up for re-election by local citizens, have more incentive
to listen to what those local citizens say. National politicians could find out if they wished to
the views and opinions of local citizens; but they will have less incentive to take theem
seriously. Understanding why this is so depends critically on appreciating the significance of
the incompleteness of political contracts.
4.2  The incompleteness of contracts
4.2.1  The notion of incompleteness
Whether in economic or in political life, a contract allocating responsibility to various
parties for the accomplishment of certain tasks can never cover all the eventualities that may
occur. This may be because the parties simply do not foresee all relevant eventualities; it Wi
certainly be because the cost of writing contracts to cover them all would be prohibitive; and
more subtly, some eventualities, though foreseeable and describable, could not be verified by
any agency capable of enforcing the contract. For example, suppose the national government
tried to sign an undertaking with the citizens of the provincial city to indemnify them
financially if the performance of their transportation system were inadequate. Even in
circumstances where .he citizens and the government both knew perfecty  well that the
3 Note that  the higher incentive  of  local politicians to  use  local
information does  not  imply  that  corruption may  be  a  lesser problem  in
decentralized  governments.  In  fact,  corruption  may actually  become  a more  serious
problem  if  increased  access  to  information  is  not  matched  by  increased
accountability  of local authorities.
20performanoe  of the system  was inadequate,  such  a clause would  be unenforceable.
Thanks to Coase's (1937)  insight that a good theory  of the firm had to be built on a
precise  description  of the costs of transactions,  theorists  of the firm have long focused  their
attention  on the difficulties  of writing  contracts.  If one can write explicit  contracts  for the
delivery  of some  goods  and services,  this trnsaction can be conducted  between  firms without
any loss of efficie-nicy.  When  explicit  contracts  have limitations,  there might  be place for
internal  organization.
The first formal  model  of incomplete  contracts  is the model of the employment
relationship  due to Simon  (1951)4.  Simon  argued that an employer  cannot  predict accurately
the tasks it would like a future  employee  to do; it is even impossible  to write down explicitly
a list of which tasks have  to be accomplished  under  which  circumstances.  Under these
conditions  an employment  contract  specifies  a salary  and a set of tasks that the employer  is
allowed  to ask the employee  to do. Williamson  (1975),  who provided  an essential  link
between  this literature  and the modem  formal  contracting  literature, conducts  a careful  and
exhaustive  study  of the difficulties  of contracting.
Following  Grossman  and Hart (1986),  this has been the subject  of much  recent work
which shows that even  relatively  simple  transactions  necessitate  very complex  contracts.  The
sale of an airplane  gives rise to a contract  of several  hundred  pages. Redistribution  of income
among political  districts  necessitates  fornulae whose  consequences  are not always  clearly
anticipated  by their designers.  In practice, the complexity  is reduced  by writing  contrac  that
do not discriminate  as finely  as ideally  desirable  between  different  circumstances.  For
4  Alchian  and  Demsetz  (1973)  present  counterarguments  to  the  thesis  of
Simon.
21instance,  the proportion  of the-cost  of a project  to be paid by different  levels of government
will be dependent  on the values  of a subset  of all the variables  that economic  theory  would
deem relevant. In practice  it is important  to discriminate  between  two tpsof  -variables:
I) those variables  that depend  on the actions  of the parties. For instance,
redistribution  of funds between  different  areas should  in principle  depend  on all the
effort they make  to provide  services  to the poorest  segments  of the population.
2) those  variables  that are exogeneous  to the actions  of the parties. For instance,
redistribution  should  depend  on the relative prices  of a number  of internationally
traded goods which influence  the economic  well being of the poor or the cost of
providing  them with services.
In both cases we observe  real-life  arrangements  that take into account  only sonic  of
the many variables  that are potentially  relevant.
4.2.2 Implications  f6ir  the-theory  of organizations
This renewal  of contract  theory has had powerful  implications  for the theory  of
organizations.  If it is impossible  to specify  fully  in a contract  what actions  should  be taken
by which party, the best the contract  can do may be to decide  which  party has the discretion
to take the relevant  decision. In other words, contracts  become  less a matter of specifying
particular  actions  and more  a matter  of allocating  rights of control. By contrast,  complete
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control.
The notion  of control  paves  the way for decisions  with a "0-lu &r  uyes-.nou chramcter
*  in contract  theory.  This sheds  light  on issues  of integration:  organizations  are or are not
*  vertically  integrated  with each  other. This type of sharp  distinction  is not easily  available  in
standard  contracting  models.
The idea  that parties  to a contract  will need  to agree  on allocations  of control  rights
also helps  to explan the power  of incumbency  in organizations.  With  a complete  long  term
contract  the only benefits  of incumbency  come  from the accumulation  of specific  capital  or
other  physical  changes  in the system.  All the rents  associated  with  these  benefits  can in
general  be extracted  by the party  who has the most  bargaining  power  at the outset.  With
incomplete  contracts,  the situation  changes.  One  must  often  leave  some  power  ax-post  to the
agent, who may share  in the rents associated  with the contract  even  if there is no asymmetry
of information.
4.2.3 Implications  for the theory  of decentralization
This insight  can  be applied  to the problem  of the difference  between  giving  the right
to control  an agency  to a local government  or to a ce'ntral  goverment.  The contract  between
the agency  and its controlling  body specifies  certain  actions  that it must  take, certain  rights
that it has, but also certain  actions  that the controlling  government  body  is entitled  to take. In
order  to understand  the consequences  of the contract,  it is therefore  crucial to understand  the
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objectives of the controlling body, and hence to know its identity. So in the case of the city
transportation  authority,  answering  to a local  controlling  body will mean  having  its policy
determined  by strictly  local considerations,  which  is desirable  so long  as spillover  effects  on
and from other regions  are small. Answering  to a national  controlling  body would  mean
possibly  benefitting  from the national  coordination  of policy  but also being run by those  with
many other priorities  than the welfare  of citizens  of the city concerned.  Centalization  may
be said therefore  to improve  coordination  but reduce  accountability.
Similarly,  the contract  between  the electorate  and a politician  elected  to office  is very
incomplete.  The actions  taken  by the politician  will depend  on a number  of factors,  including
the other tasks for which  he is responsible.  This is rather  trite, but it is very difficult  to
integrate  those  considerations  in a complete  contract  model,  where the electorate  can give
sophisticated  instructions  to the politician  and adjust  precisely  the reward  to the action  taken.
Likewise,  contracts  between  jurisdictions  will be very incomplete,  and there will
consequenty  be limits  to the extent to which  externalities  can be internalized  purely  by
bargaining  between  jurisdictions.
A stylized  model  of political  accountability  that explicitly  incorporates  the
incompleteness  of contracts  is presented  in Seabright  (1994).  We describe  the basic  model  in
the Appendix  and derive its fundamental  relationships;  for applications  and versions  that
relax some  of the more  simplistic  assumptions,  the reader is referred to the original  paper.
Essentially  it is a model  in which  voters seek to provide  politicians  with incentives  to act in
their interests.  However,  the 'performance"  of the politicians  depends  on factors  that are not
verifiable  and cannot  be made  the subject  of an explicit  contract.  Therefore  the only way to
24provide politicians with the right incentives  is to give voters the power to eject them if they
are dissatisfied.
Centralization  in this model involves  two features. Its advantage  is that by allowing
the central govemment to control more levers of policy it internalises  any externalities
between the regions. Its disadvantage  is that any onejregion  loses its ability to eject the
goverment  purely according to its own preferences;  it faces the risk that in some
circumstances  a government  will be re-elected whom it would  have wished to eject, because
of the preferences of other regions.
4.3  Renegotiation  of contracts
A federal gcvernment  promises support for the construction  by a local government  of
an irrigation system if a certain number of conditions  are met: a design made by a reputable
engineering  firm, a cost benefit analysis which proves the desirability  of going ahead, and a
public hearing of the users. The local government  complies  with the first two conditions,  but
not with the third, which it feels  politically  dangerous. If it has been smart enough to keep
the design of the system within acceptable  bounds  it can, explicitly  or implicitly,  propose to
the federal government  the following  deal: "Why don't you accept to fund the project, even
though some conditions  have not been met? You will be better off than if you did not fund it,
and so would wet.  Under the general principle ftat bygones are bygones, the federal
25government  should accept this deal 5. The original  contract  is not "renegotiation  proof". The
awareness  of this fact will weaken  the incentives  of the local government  to respect the terms
of the original  agreement.
The general idea is straightforward:  if during the execution  of a contract  it becomes
clear that it can be modified  to increase  the utility of all the pardes involved, the original
contract  will be modified  at this point. Foreseeing  this modification,  the parties may modify
their behavior  in previous periods.
This has important  policy consequences,  and makes  it possible  to understand  policy
choices that seem mysterious.  For instance,  penalities  for delay in large projects are often
renegotiated  away when the contractor  is late. The expectation  of this renegotation
encourages  delay. However, this is often unavoidable.  Once the project is late, the client will
often prefer not to impose  the penalty so as to keep carrots with which to encourage  not too
untimely  completion  (see Cramer and Seabright  (1994, forthcoming)).
4.4  Unresolved  issues
In the excitement  of new discovery, it is easy to underestimate  the number and
importance  of topics which  are important  on applied grounds  and on which the literature has
difficulty  progressing.  We mention  four.
We are  ignoring  some  important  real  world  considerations,  such  ao  the
desirability  for the  federal government  to  appear "tough"  in possible
subsequent  negotiations.
26Dynamics  and tmnsitions:  We do not understand well the dynamics of organizations.
There is informal evidence that transitions  between one line of activity and another, between
one industry  and another, between one organizational  form and another are difficult and
require time. Analytical  treatment of these phenomena  is very difficult.
The constitutional  framework: The contracts, implicit or explicit, that govern the life
of an organization  have different statuses. Some  are more fundamental  than others, rather as,
in the legal realm, clauses of constitutions  have a higher status and are more difficult to
change than ordinary laws. This hierarchy of rules, important in private firms and even more
so in governments,  is poorly understood.
Multidimensional  uncertainty: Most of current theory has been developed  in settings
where uncertainty  bears on the value of one real variable. The extension to multidimensional
uncertainty  creates very difficult technical  problems, and has been successfully  completed
only in very special cases. It is difficult to give precise advice on methods to circumvent  the
problem, but one should be aware of this fact when using the insights of the theory.
Networks  of contracts: Recently a number of authors have stressed the fact that finns
should be thought of as networks or nexuses of contracts or of treaties (see C-rmer and
Riordan, 1987; Aoki, Gustafson  & Williamson, 1990). However, very little formal work has
been done on the interrelationships  between different  contracts signed by the same agent. For
instance, a provincial government will be party to contracts signed with the federal
27government,  with  the districts  at a lower level, with the unions  representing  its employees,
implicitly  with the voters,  etc. We do not understand  very well how these  contract interact
with each other.
5.  What is p jurisdiction  and where should  its boundaries  lie?,
Traditional  micro  economic  theory takes  the definition  of the firm and its objectives
as given. The theory of the firm began  making  substantial  progress  by asking  the seemingly
very abstract  question:  "what is a firm?" Even though  the answers  we have  are still
imperfect,  the work done to find them has yielded  lessons  that have  very concrete  policy
implications.  It is therefore  a reasonable  strategy  to try to ask the question:  'whiat  is a
political  jurisdiction?"
5.1 Coordination
One important  aspect  of the definition  of the fim  is that it groups together  numerous
types of activities.  Similarly,  if we are to develop  a good understanding  of political
jurisdictions,  we need  to take  seriously  the notion  that they integrate  the power  to make
decisions  in different  domains.  Indeed,  jurisdictions  can be thought  of as ogmztosta
group  together  the power.to  take political  decisions,  and 'we  can ask what determines  the
grouping  of activities  by analogy  with the grouping  of activities  within  a finn.
Simon  (1973)  has argued  that what determines  the grouping  of activities  is the
28necessty  of coordination  of activities  in the short run. Crdmer  (1981)  has analyzed  formally
this coordination.  The following  example,  drawn from this paper, provides fth  necessary
intuition.
The allocation  of responsibilities  for transportation  within  a country  is usually  done  by
mode of transportation.  This seems  to neglect  the fundamental  nature  of the good. From the
point  of view  of consumers,  a plane  trip between  Paris and Lyons  has more similarity  with a
train trip between  the same  two cities  than with a plane  trip between  Paris and Toulouse.
Yet, it is the two train trips that are the responsibility  of the same'agency,  not the two trips
between  Paris and ]Lyons.  Why is that? In the day to day management  of the trnsortation
system,  the decisions  to be taken  are decisions  that  involve  the planes  and the crews  tha wfll
flow between  all towns.  Very fe"v'  short run decisions  involve  planes  and trains at the same
time. It is tru-e  that for planning  purposes  one should  weigh  carefulfly  the options  of plane  and
train transportation  one against  the other. These  decisions  are made  in circumstances  where
time is not a crucial  faictor,  and hence  the extra difficulty  of coordination  between  agencies  is
not very important.
For the management  of infrastructure,  this might  have some  important  connces.
For instance,  one could think  that main  irigation channels  could be, let us say, a provincial
responsibility,  whereas  smaller  branches  could  be a Municipal  responsibility.  This can only
be true in circumstances  where  there is no necessity  to coordinate  rapidly  the management  of
the two parts of the system.
295.2 Contlbyl  voters
The thieory  of the  firm has spent much  energy trying  to understand  die mechanisms
through  which managers  of corporations  are controlled.  Stcckholders  have  bounded
rationality,  and both the acquisition  of information  and the exercice  of the right to vote on
corporate  matters  have relatively  large costs. Furthermore,  the benefits  of any improvement
in corporate  performance  generated  by such  activities  are shared  with all the other
stockholders.  It would  seem therefore  that corporations  are undercotrolled. The mechanisms
used to remedy  this situation  are of two kinds. First, the control  of the day to day
management  of the firm cani  be delegated  to specialists  (i.e. the board  of directors).  Second,
underperforming  firmns  will be targets  for takeovers  if outsiders  believe  that they can run the
firm in ways that increase  its profits.  There is general  consensus  that the question  of control
affects  considerably  the structure  and the behavior  of ognztnS.
Different  forms  of grouping  together  activities  affect  considerably  the nature  of the
control  that is exercised  on political  managers.  First, relying  on cooperation  between  layers
of government  often  blurs responsibility  for the execution  of particular  projects,  and hence
might  have  negative  effects  on efficiency.  This is a common  problem  in water projects  in
some  parts of Latin  America  for instance  wher-e  coordination  efforts  become  a highly  time
consuming  part of project  management.  Second,  even  where responsibilities  are separate  it
makes  sense  to divide  them according  to principles  that are easy to remember.  For example,
allocating  responsibility  for different  types  of road to different  levels  of governmnent
sometimes  results  in difficulties  in identifying  who is in charge  of what.
30Because voters invest in information  gathering  about the performance  of local
governments,  there is some  organizational  capital  invested  in the quality  of participation  in
public  life at different  levels. For instance,  in a system  where municipal  governments  are
powerful,  voters  will pay attention  to the actions  of the mayor, newspapers  will develop
sources  in townhalls,  and so on. Under  these  conditions  there will be strong  benefits  to
allocate  new responsibilities  to townhalls,  rather  than to weaker,  and therefore  less
controlled,  political  entities.  One  can expect  a certain stability  of the allocation  of power  in
the system.
If these  intuitions  resist  further analysis,  and if they are as important  in practical
terms as we suspect  that they are, the consequences  for the organization  of the public  sector
are strildng.  Because  one cannot  determine  the optimal  level of government  for specific  tasks
in isolation,  it does not make  sense  to study  the decentralization  of decisions  about
infrastructure  in isolation  from the allocation  of other public  responsibilities.  For instance,
landfill  managagement  will be assigned  to the municipalities,  because  they are responsible  for
garbage  collection,  and they are responsible  for garbage  collecetion  because  they have  better
information  about  the use of land, having  gathered  this information  in order to collect
property  taxes.
Note that there is a cost to pushing  too much  responsibility  onto one level of
government.  If the central  government,  for instance,  is responsible  for too many  activities
each of them  will have  relatively  little weight  in the decisions  of the voters, and hence  it will
be easier  to run some  of them for private  rather  than public  benefits.
316.  Some  Applicaions
6.1  The optimal  size of a jurisdiction
Decentralization  below  the national  level  is relatively  systematically  promoted  in the
literature.  Very often, one sees lists  stating  that this decision  is to be taken  at the federal
level,  this other at the state  level,  and yet another  at the local level.  Why would  the
efficiency  criterion  be a certain  number  of levels  below  the national  level?  Some  countries
have  a smaller  national  population  than states  or municipalities  in other countries.  It would
seem  that population,  or area, or some  other measure  of the services  to be rendered  would  be
a more  logical  criterion,  and if this is the case,  it does  not make  much  sense  to push
decentralization  on smaller  countries.
On the other  hand, the notion  of control  might  help explain  why the optimal  number
of levels  might  vary in such  a way  that the smaller  district  is larger  in large countries  than in
smaller  countries.  The bounded  rationality  of voters  prevents  them  from exercising  adequate
control  over more  than a certain  number  of govemmental  identities,  a number  which  is
independent  of the size of the country.
6.2  Does  decentralization  promote  democracy?
It is often  argued  that decentralization  will  promote  democracy:  local governments  are
more  sensitive  to local  needs,  hence  an individual  has more  possibilities  to influence.
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decisions that affect his life and his welfare under greater decentralization. This statement
can be mnade  more precise in two ways. First, under decentalization, there is a greater
responsiveness  of decisions with respect to the changes of preference of a single agent or
group of similar agents. Second, under decentralization,  there is a higher probability that a
given agent or group of agents is pivotal, and hence determines the choice of a solution
between two altematives.
However, these generalizations  will hold, if they do, only when all other factors are
equal. In particular, it is important to notice that decentralization  might lower the political
power of the poorest citizens (see Seabright, 1994, section 3). Under decentralization,
government will indeed be more sensitive to local needs, but it will still be local needs as
perceived by the local political system. Hence, the groups that find it easier to organize
political activity at the local level will be favored by decentralization.  Orgaization  of
political forces is easier for groups where the benefits of influencing  public policy is shared
among a small number of agents. Groups that have more difficulty  organizing will in general
prefer larger political districts so that organizing  is easier. Some political backing comes
from the fact that political forces that have favored income equality have generally favored
centralized governments.
6.3  Why should decentralization  lead to more experimentation?
The argument is often made that decentralization  promotes experimentation:  free from
the strictures of central administration,  local governments  can try out new ideas and methods.
33Decentralization  of decisions  in water supply matters for instance has led Fortaleza in the
North East of Brazil to adopt cheaper technological  solutions such as community water
pumps not yet tried in the South of the country where traditional large utilities have typically
been the norm. The diversity of experiences ini  urban tranport in France or in India for
instance also illustrates what municipalities  can do when given the freedom 50  choose.
However, one must be careful with this argument. If the regions of the country are
very different, it does indeed seem likely that local control will lead to more diversification.
On the other hand, experimenting with a new technique  creates positive externalities for
other districts: they do not suffer the consequences  of potental failures but benefit from the
information generated.
It might seem that one could have the best of both worlds: use a decentralized system
to benefit from local adaptation, and have the centml government fund experimentation.  But
note that it is very difficult to write a contract that will indeed incite a district to experiment
with a different institutional arrangements. It is difficult to define precisely what is the
innovation; typically, institutional innovations  are refined during implementation. It is also
difficult to check whether it has indeed been implemented.
6.4  Decentralizing  education
Seventy percent of French people believe that regional governments should be given
more power in the Financing  and the management  of schools; 60% believe that they should
be given more power in the recruiting of teachers. On the other hand, only 30% call for a
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greater role of regions  in the development  of curricula  and 12%  are willing  to give the
responsibility  for the granting  of diplomat. It seems  fair to summarize  these results  by
saying  that French  people  believe  that programs  and standards  should  be decided  at the
mntional  level, but that schools  should  be managed  locally.  We should  like to show  that the
desirability  of such  an allocation  can be fruitfully  analyzed  using  the conceptual  framework
sketched  in this paper.
To consider  the allocation  of powers  over the management  of schools,  we must first
weigh  externalities  between  localities  and knowledge  of local conditions.  The extenalities
stem from migration:  students  trained  in a district  may  go and spend  their adult  lives in
another  district, and therefore  the social  benefits  of training  are only partially  enjoyed  by the
district  of schooling.  The national  setting  of the curriculum,  and the verification  through
national  exams  that the curriculum  is actually  learned  by the students,  prevent  free riding  by
districts.  On the other hand, decentralizing  the management  of the schools  allows  for better
adaptation  to local tastes  by a better  setting  of the dates  of vacations,  hiring  of teachers  who
are sensitive  to local culture,  and so on.
This analysis,  which  draws  entirely  on the conventional  wisdom  on decentalization  as
we described  it in section  2, has strong  policy  implications,  some  of which we do not believe
would  be generally  accepted.  For instance,  below  a certain  degree  of inter district  mnigration,
responsibility  for curriculum  and standards  become  the responsibility  of regions. The  analysis
is also based  on assumptions  which seem  difficult  to defend.  For instance,  if tastes  are
6  More precisely, 12% agree with the statement that "...leu r6gionu
devraient  pouvoir  remplacer  les  diplomes  nationaux  par  des  diplames  r&gionauxw.
These  statistics  are  taken  from  Le Monde  de l'Education,  octobre  1993 (from  poll
conducted by SCP Communication  of 858 persons,  representative  of the French
population.
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regionally  differentiated  for vacations  and personality  of teachers,  why are they not
regionally  differentiated  for curriculum  and the organization  of examinations?
Of course, all the elements  sketched  above  are important  in reality. However,  we
believe  that an essential  element  of reality  is missed  if we do not think  in more contractual
terms. To use a contractual  approach,  we must first identify  the fundamental  contacting
difficulties  between  the public  and the school  system.  As a first approximation
1) consumers  of school  services  (parents  and/or pupils)  have  good information  about
the pleasure  that they derive  from the school  system  (facilities,  friendliness  of
teachers...).
2) on the other hand, they have  poor information  about the difficulty  and the quality
of the curriculum.
The separation  of powers  defined  above  provides  a way to circumvent  the second
difficulty,  while maintaining  the advantages  of control  by consumers  on the aspect  they
control  best.  On the aspects  that the consumers  understand  best, power  should  be local
because  "voice" can be exerciced  more  easily  at that level. On the other  hand, it is very
costly  for the citizens  to judge the appropriateness  of locally  set standards.  There exist  strong
incentives  for the local government  to hide low standards  in order to improve  the pecption
of the quality  of the education  that is provided.
By detaching  the right  of control  over standards  from the right of control  over
management  of the school, one limits  the incentives  to tinker with  standards.  Comison  of
36the results  in national  exams  between  different  districts  provides  the basis for a fast  judgment
by citizens  of the quality  of their school  districts.
A complete  analysis  would  include  many  other factors:
I) a discussion  of the burdens  that changes  of standards  can impose  of the districts
and their  non internalization  by the national  authority;
2) a discussion  of the tension  due to the fact that the consequences  of neglect  of the
educational  sector  has consequences  that may not be felt until  after the next  election;
3) a discussion  of the reallocation  of resources  depending  on the wealth  of the
districts.
Nevertheless,  our analysis  already  has strong  policy implications.  In particular  the
desirability  of the proposed  organization  does  depend  on a certain  national  homogeneity  of
tastes for curriculum,  but not at all on the intensity  of migration  between  districts.
6.5  Earmarking
In many  East Asian  and Latin  American  countries,  earmarking  is or has been  a
common  of way  for subnational  governments  to finance  some  of their major  infrastructure
expenditures  and hence  deserves  a careful  assessment  in a discussion  of decentralition.
McCleary  (1991)  provides  a useful  survey  of the arguments  for and against  carmarking  of
revenues.  Defining  earmarldng  as "the  pracice of assigning  revenue  - genrally through
37statute  or constitutional  clause  -- from specific  taxes  or groups  of taxes to specific
government  activities  or areas of activity",  he develops  a number  of criteria  that allow
identification  of the cases  when  it is justified.  These  criteria  reflect  the lessons  of experience
but some  lessons  from standard  welfare  economics.  They  can be revisited  in the language  of
incomplete  contracts.
6.5.1  Earmarling  arises  because  of incomplete  contracts
McCleary  recognizes  that earmarking  is a second  best  solution:  in the absence  of
imperfections  in the government  budgetary  system  it should  no.  be used. For instance,  in
some  countries  taxes  on fuels  and vehicles  are earmarked  for a road construction  fund. This
practice  has been  defended  as a mean  to provide  "more  stable  funding  (that)  would  encourage
competition". Translated  into our framework,  this argument  goes as follows:
1) Entrepreneurs  will enter the road construction  industry  only if they can  be
relatively  confident  that the government  has a long run commitment  to the building  of
roads so that they  have  a reasonable  probability  of recovering  their  investments.
2) The complete  contract  approach  to this problem  would  have the government  make
a contract  with entrepreneurs  defining  conditions  under  which  roads  would oe built,
the prices  which  would  be paid, and the penalties  that the government  is willig  to
incurr if it does not pursue  this program.  Such  contracts  are not feasible.
3) Therefore,  a second  best approach  is for the government  to commit  itself thrugh a
3 8second best, albeit imperfect  contract:  the resources  coming  from a specific  source
should  go to a specific  use.
This way of stating  the problem  allows  a few refinements  of MJcCleary's  analysis.  For
instance,  McCleauy  argues  that "when money  is tight, earmarked  funds may be temporarily
frozen (as happened  in Ghana)  or diverted  to other uses (as in Mali), or the government  and
public  entrerises  may stop paying  their fuel bills and hence  fuel taxes (as they did in
Zaire)". This shows that a commitment  to earmadcing  is not fully  credible;  this might  imply
that earmarking  cannot  achieve  what it sets out to achieve  and that it would  be better  not to
attempt  it. However,  it is also recognized  that "the more  reliable  funding  has made  it easier
to use private  contractors  through  competitive  bidding".  Ex-ante,  the earmarking  was
recognized  by private  entrepreneurs  as a way to increase  government  commitment.
We believe  that an approach  that takes into account  fr-om  the outset  the fact that all
contracts  are incomplete  should  be able to weigh  better the costs and benefits  of earmiarking.
It does not work perfectly,  because  commitment  to earmarking  is sometimes  reversible  and
because  it potentially  distorts  government  allocation  of funds. But if we can understand
exactly  how and in what circumstances  it increases  the cost to government  of reversing  its
expenditure  commitments,  this will help to quantify  the benefits  it can provide.
Thse  incomplete  contracts  approach  can also guard against  certain misconceptions.  For
instance,  McCleary  argues that earmarking  should  only take  place when there is "anx
appropriate  investment  progr-am  and a clear set of rules to regulate  investment  dec-isions,  the
mix of spending  on capital, maintenance  and rehabilitation,  and administrative  overheads"
39(ibid. p.102).
Notice  that if there did exist  a clear set of rules, and a credible  investment  program,
there would  be no need for earmarking.  It would  be possible  to write a rather explicit  set of
rules that the government  should  follow.  This approach  seems  to be in conhadiction  with the
rmcognition  that it is the difficulty  of writing  contracts  that makes  earmarking  necessary.
To see this, let us use an example.  Consider  a country,  such  as Columbia,  where the
federal  government  has responsibility  for road building  but states  have  responsibilit.y  for
maintenance.  Presumably,  the federal  government  has responsibility  for the construction  of
roads  because  there are externalities  and the state  govemments  would  not of their own
volition  build  enough.  If this is the case, left to their own they would  also underinvest  in
maintenance.  The federal  government  should  therefore  find some  technique  to encourage  the
local government  to conduct  more maintenance  (we assume  for the moment  that state
governments  have  a comparative  advantage  in maintenatice,  perhaps  because  local monitoring
of road quality  is easier).
If there were clear cut indicators  of the quality  of mamtenance  undertaken  by state
governments,  the federal  government  could  easily  sign  a contract  with  them linkng a
payment  to the quantity  and quality  of the maintenance  that had been done, as well as to
factors  over which  they did not have  control. It is because  such  indicators  are not available
that other techniques  must  be found. Earmarking  may be one of them  since  it can be
reasonable  to order the local government  to earmark  all the receipts  from local gasoline  taxes
and from tolls to maintenance.  Its has the advantage  of providing  an automatic  link between
the usage  of the transportation  network  and maintenance.  It can also have  a high opprftnity
40cost in terms of other decentralized  expenditure  needs  (education,  health,...) when  local
resources  constraints  are important.
7.  =Qnc1uding[remarks
This paper has done no more  than scratch  the surface  of a literature  rich in both
theoretical  and practical  insights.  Its key messages  are the following:
1)  The modern  theory  of the firm provides  many  insights  into political
organization,  for political  jurisdictions  can be thought  o  as pseudo-firms  that provide
services  and which  group  together  decision-maldng  activities  of various  ldnds.
2)  Questions  about  decentralization  in government  are questons about the
allocation  of rights  of control.  If contractual  relations  were complete  it would not
matter  whether  nower were decentralized  or not, since  contracts  would  specify
everything  to be done at each  level of government  and there would  be no need  for
discretion.
3)  The appropriate  degree  of decentralization  depends  upon which  level  of
goverment  will have  the most  incentive  to act to bring  about  the desired  outcomes.  In
particular,  centralized  governments  can reap benefits  of coordination,  but tend to be
less accountable  than decentralized  ones, though  there are iinportant  exceptions  to this
41general  rule.
4)  The  organizaidonal  design  of government  affec  not only  incentives  to
take  decisions  but  also incentives  to gather  the  information  on which  tho  decisions
will  be based.References
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44Centralisation versus Depentralisation: a simple model
The model of this appendix is drawn from Seabright (1994). The population in a
certain area is divided between two regions 1 and 2. The people will elect a government; this
may be either a govemment for each region, or a single central government. After the
election the govemments have to implement a policy vector a:  the regional governments
would choose simultaneously the value of scalars xl  and x2 respectively, while a central
govemment would choose both scalars. In this sense we can think of xl  as being the policy
instrument of region 1, in that it is an instrument available to whichever authority governs
region 1. Without loss of generality we assume that the welfare of the population in region I
is strictly increasing in xl,  and the welfare of the population in region 2 is strictly increasing
in x2. The welfare of the population in region 1 may also depend positively or negatively on
x2, and that in region 2 on the value of x2. To help intuition, where these externalities are
positive we shall characterise the policies as "efficiency-enhancing", since policies that help
one region also help the other; where they are negative we shall call them 'redistributive',
since policies that help one region are at the expense of the other.
The values of xl  and x2 chosen by the governments are not directly observable by the
population but remain the private information of the government. The welfare of the
population in each region, while observable by both the population and the government, is
not verifiable; consequently the constitution cannot specify rewards or penalties for the
government conditional on the welfare attained. By contrast, the extemalities between regions
are verifiable, and the constitution can make the assignment of powers conditional upon tieir
magnitude. Note that the constitution may not make explicit reference to the magnitude of
externalities, but may assign powers according to implicit  judgments by the framers of the
constitution about their magnitude. Alternatively, where externalities vary from case to case
in ways that are verifiable the constitution may specify an allocation of powers explicitly
contingent on their magnitude (see note 3 below).
The unobservability of govremment  action matters in this model because higher values
of xl  and x2 are costly for the governments (they involve 'effort").  Indeed in this simple
model we can interpret xl  and x2 directly as the levels of effort undertaken by the
governments concerned. Since these levels are unobservable, governments must be induced
to undertake such effort by the threat that they will not be re-elected if the populations are
not satisfied with their levels of welfare. Re-election therefore has a value for thiem  (the
spoils of office), which we shall represent by W for the regional governments and aW for
the central government. The value of not being re-elected is normalised to zero. The
population's welfare is also, however, affected by additive but unobserved region-specific
shocks yl  and y2; if their welfare net of these shocks falls short of some reservation level C
(which can be interpreted as the welfare they might expect from a rival political party) they
will wish to throw out the govemment. Regional governments will fail to be re-elected if the
welfare level of the population in the region falls below C; a central government, however,
will fail to be re-elected only if both regions' welfare falls below C.
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Centralization  in this model,  therefore,  involves  two features.  Its advantage  is that  by
allowing  the cental government  to control  both  xl and x2 it internalises  any externalities
between  the regions.  Its disadvantage  is that any one region  loses its ability  to qejct  the
govemnent  purely  according  to its own preferences;  it faces  the risk that in some
circumstances  a government  will be re-elected  whom  it would  have  wished  to eject, because
of the preferences  of the other region  (we could  alternatively  have  assumed  that it faced  a
risk that a government  would  be ejected  whom  it would  have  wished  to re-elect,  but nothing
significant  would  be changed  by assuming  this).
The order of events  is as follows:
1)  A form of govenment (centralised  or decentralised)  is chosen.
2)  The govemment(s)  choose  K.
3)  The region-specific  shocks  yl and y2 are realised  (but not observed  by the
populations).
4)  The populations'  welfare  is realised  and they  decide  whether  to re-elect  their
government(s).
The welfare  of region  I is given  by Ui(xl,x2) + yi, where  Ui is strictly  increasing
and concave  in xi, and concave  in its other argument.  For simplicity,  we assume  yi to be
uniformly  distributed  with support  [O,Yi],  and we assume  that this support  (and  the value  of
C) are such as to generate  interior  solutions.
The welfare  of regional  government  Pi is given  by Vi(xi) + W if relected and
Vi(xi) if not re-elected,  where  Vi is strictly  decreasing  and concave.  The welfare  of natonal
govemment  E is given  by V(xi,x2)  + aW if re-elected  and V(xl,x2) if not We assume  that
dV(dxi)/dxi  = dVi(xi)/dxi;  this is to ensure  that neither  form of government  has an intinsic
advantage  over the other  arising from a differing  marginal  distufility  of effort
We can now compare  the results  under two different  forms  of government
Regional  Government
The government  in each  region  i will choose  xi to maximise
(2.1)  B  [ Vi(xi)  +  W]
= Vi(xi) + W.prIui(xl,x2)+yi >  C]
= Vi(xi) + W.pr(yi > = C-Ui(xl,x2)]
= Vi(xi) + W(Yi+Ui(xl,x2)-C)IYi  for interior  solutions,  given the  uniform
distribution  of yi.
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.(2.2)  - dVi(xi)/dxi =  (W/Yi)(dUi/dxi)
What this means  is that the disutility  of effort is equated  to the value  of staying  in
office multiplied  by the marginal  increase  in probability  of re-election.  Note that Vi and Yi
need not be the same for each region;  consequently  the values  of xl and x2 chosen  by the
regional  governments  may not be the same.
-Cntml  Goverment
The central government  E will choose  xl and x2 to maximise
(2.3)  E [V(xI,x2) + aW].
=  V(xl,x2)  +  aW.pr[Ul(xl,x2)+yl  > =  C or U2(xl,x2)+y2  >=  C]
=  V(xl,x2) + aW.(I-pr[Ul(xl,x2)+yl  <  C and U2(xl,x2)+y2  <  C])
To simplify  notation,  denote  by ql the event that Ul(xI,x2)+yl  <  C and by q2 the event
that U2(xl,x2)+y2  c  C. Then we can rewrite  E's objective  function  as
(2.4)  V(xl,x2) + aW.(l-pr(qi).pr(qj J  qi))  for each i
*  -=  V(xl,x2) + caW.(l-pr(qi).pr(qj  I  qi))
=V(xl,x2)  + aW.(l-((C-Ui(xl,x2))/Yi).pr(qj I qi))
The first order conditions  for this problem  are
(2.5)  - dVi(xi)/dxi  =  (crW/Yi)(dUi(xi)/dxi).pr(qj  I qi)
+  aWpr(qi)(dUj/dxi)(dpr(qj  f  qi)/dUj)  for each i
And comparing  this to equation  (2.2) we can see what difference  cen  ion  makes
to the solution.  The disutility  of effort in implementing  each policy instrument  is under
regional  government  set equal  to the marginal  increase  in probability  of re-election  multiplied
by the value of being re-elected.  The probability  of re-election  is just the probability  th  fthe
:welfare  of the population  of the region  concerned  falls below its threshold  level. Under
cental government  this second  term is multiplied  by the probabilit  hat the welfare  of the
population  of the other region  falls below its threshold  level, to reflect the fact that it takes
both regions to be dissatisfied  for the government  to be ejected. Other things  equal, this will
'  lower the value of the right hand side of equation  (2.5) and result in a lower effort by the
-government  and-  a lower utility for the population;  this is a dimct  consequence  of the reduced
47s  acoutablit  cosequent upon centralisation.  But now there are two other  effects  to take
intoaccunt.Oneis  due to the possibly  greater  incentive  for effort due to greater  spoils  of
offce  t  atina  leel(represented by the factor  a). The second  is represented  by the second
term on the right hand side of (2.5): the externality  due to the impact  of xi on region  j's
Z. welfare  has now been intemnalised.  How mnuch  difference  it makes  to the government's  effort
wili in turn  depend  on the difference  it makes  to the probability  of re-election,  which  is
precisely  equal  to the marginal  increase  in the probability  that the population  of region  j are
satisfied,  conditional  on the population  of region  i's being dissatisfied.  And whether  it
increases  or reduces  the government's  effort will depend,  of course, on whether  the
externality  was positive  or negative  in the first  place.
If the latter  two effects  outweigh  the first, a central  government  would  make  more
effort to implement  the policy  instrument  of region  i than would  regional  governments.
Whether  the population  of regio'n  i is better  off as a consequence  wil depend,  of course, on
what happens  to the effort the government  makes  to implement  the instrument  of region  j, as
well as on whether  this has a positive  or negative  external  impact  on region  i.
It is worth  noting  that, if each region's  welfare  were verifiable  as well as being
observable,  the constitution  could  specify  rewards  and penalties  conditional  upon  welfare,
and the adverse  impact  of centralisation  on accountability  would  disappear.  IdWeed,  it is
straightforward  to see that, sicne there is no risk-effort  trade-off  in the model,  such  a
constitution  could  always  implement  the first-best  under either  form of government.
We can summarise  equations  (2.2) and (2.5)  in words:
Under  regional govemmuent:
Marginal  disutiLity  VaLue  of  MarginaL  increase
of  effort  reeLection  X  in  probabiLity
to  regionaL  that  region  is
goverriment  seti1sfijed
Under  central govermieent:
NarginaL  disutiLity  VaLue  of  MarginaL  increase  ProbabiLity
of  effort  n  reeLection  X  in  pro)abiLity  X  that  this
to centraL  that  region  is  region's
goverrsient  satisfied  wetlare
determines
reelection
Pwlu  value of  Spittover  on  Effect  of  welfare  ProbabiLity
reeLection  X  weLfare  of  X  increase  on  prob-  X  that other
to central  other  region  abiLity that other  region's
government  region  is satisfied  wetfare
determineis
reelection
What kinds of conclusion can be drawn from thiii analysis? We begin by considering
4 8the simplest case where policies are efficiency-enhancing (so spillovers are positive and
therefore increases in effort are unambiguously  a good thing for both regions) and where the
value of reelection is the same at regional and national level (so a  is equal to one). Eight
conclusions can be drawn,  some obvious, some less so:
1)  First, the analysis confirms the basic intuition that the case for centrdlisation is
stengthned  if there are significant spillovers between regions. That is to say, the likelihood
that centralisation will increase government effort and consequently population welfare is
increased if spillovers are large.
2)  It also gives a precise sense to the notion that the cost of centralisation is a loss of
local accountability. Here the loss of accountability  is the fact that the welfare of a region
now has a probability less than one of being the decisive factor in whether or not the
government is reelected.
3)  A less obvious conclusion is that a positive correlation between region-specific shocks
strengthens the case for centralisation. To see this, note that the probability that any region's
welfare is decisive in whether or not the central government is re-elected is the probability
that the other region is dissatisfied (since it takes two dissatisfied regions to eject a central
government). But this is not an unconditional probability; rather it is the probability that the
other region is dissatisfied, conditional on this region's being dissatisfied (that  is, it is not
pr(qj) in equation (2.5) but pr(qj  I qi)). And this conditional probability is higher the greater
is the correlation between the shocks to the two regions. At the extreme, if the shocks are
perfectly correlated, the risk that any region will find itself unable to eject a government with
which it is satisfied because the other region is of a different view becomes negligible, and
there is no loss of accountability in centralisation.
4)  Note that this does not at all the same thing as saying that regional similarity
strengthens the case for centralisation. If differences between regions are incorporated in
their different utility functions or the different distributions of their region-specific shocks
(variables that are known to populations and governments before any decision are taken),
then both regional and central governments are entirely capable of setting different values of
xl  and x2 to reflect these differences. Centralisation makes neither easier nor more difficult
the regional differentiation of policy. It is the degree of correlation of shocks (which are nif
observed by the populations) that affects the degree of centralisation. To put it another way,
what weakens local accountability is not the risk that regions will require different policies; it
is the risk that regions will be differentially satisfied with whatever policies they have.
5)  Centralisation may benefit some regions and not others. In particular, the magnitude
of spillovers may vary between regions. In such circumstances the recipients of large
spillovers from other regions are more likely to benefit from centralisation than are the
recipients of small ones.
6)  The more  entrenched'  governments are, in the sense that the more unlikely voters
49are to wish to eject them, the stronger  the case for regional  as opposed  to central
government.  This is because,  if it is unlikely  that one region  will want to eject its
government  it is relatively  even more  unlikely  that both regions  will wish  to, so the loss of
-accountability  from centralisation  is relatively  great.
7)  The interest  of citizens  in one or other form  of government  is not necessarily  shared
by their  political  representatives.  Regional  politicians  will lose, and central politicians  gain,
from centralisation,  whatever  the benefits  to their  citizens.  Furthennore,  if some  politicians
are potentially  mobile,  in the sense  that they have  a significant  probability  of forming  the
government  under  either central  or regional  arrangements,  their incentives  are perverse.  They
will have  an interest  in arguing  for centralisation  only when  its impact  in reducing
accountability  outweighs  its beneficial  impact  on intemnalising  spilovers, since under  these
circumstances  the level of effort they have  to undertake  will be reduced.
8)  A choice  between  centralised  and decentralised  formns  of government  need  not always
be made  once  and for all, but can sometimes  be undertaken  on a case-be-case  basis if it is
possible  to estimate  some  of the relevant  variables  (such  as the size  of the spilloversf.
We can now ask.  what would  be the effect of r-elaxing  the assumptions  that al  and
that spillovers.  are positive.  It might  seem  natural  to think that the value  of re-election  will
always  be greater under  central  than regional  government,  because  centra governments
command  larger resources  generaly, but it is important  to distinguish  between  the value  of
initia election  and the value  of re-election.  Former  central  politicians  typically  have  a higher
public  profile  and better  alternative  employment  opportunities  tha  former  local  politicians,
and the value  of re-election  is measured  relative  to these alternative  opportunities.
Nevertheless,  to the extent  that a exceeds  unity, the case for centamlisation  will be
strengthened.  If a is greater than the reciprocal  of the term  pr(qj I qi)) in equation  (2.5), it
may  even happen  that centralisation  leads  to higher  government  effort levels  tan
decentralisation  even without  the internalisation  of spillovers,  because  the greater  desire  of
politicians  for re-election  outweighs  their diminished  accountability.
Taking  into account  the possibility  of redistributive  policies  (those  with negative
spillovers)  somewhat  complicates  the conclusions  reached  above.  First of all, it is no longer
true that higher  levels  of effort  are always  good for the welfare  of populations.  Taking
externalities  into account  by centralisation  may actually  lower  effort  levels, and this may be
desirable  if they were previously  above  the efficient  level (as they may have  been  through
failing  to take  the externalities  into account).  If, however,  effort was previously  below  the
7  A good example of this in practice is European community
merger control, where since 1990 the question  whether the EC or
member  states  have jurisidction  over  mergers  has  been settled  with
ref  erence to the estimated  magnitude of the spillovers  between
member  states  generated  by the  merger in question.
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efficient  level (because,  for example,  W was too low to motivate  politicians  adequately),
taking  spillovers  into account  might  paradoxically  make  both regions worse  off. Region 1
could benefit  from a reduction  in the value  of x2, but lose even more by a reduction  in xl
consequent  on the government's  taing  into account  the spilHover  on region  2.
Secondly,  if a is significantly  greater than one, centralisation  may increase  the
incentive  for redistributive  policies  that harm some regiont. Suppose,  for example, that high
values  of xt impose  large costs on region  2, but that the increased  spoils from centralised
power make  the government's  enthusiasm  for pleasing  region 1 outweigh  its concern for
region  2; it may then increase  the value  of xl and make  region 2 worse  off. Such an
outcome  may seem  extreme in this simple  model,  but it is evidently  much  more likely in
circumstances  where there are many  regions,  some of which  enjoy positive  and some suffer
negative  spillovers  from the policies  of region i. The increased  incentive  due to internalising
the positive  spillovers  on the fortunate  regions may outweigh  the negative  spillovers  on the
others, especially  if these latter are unlikely  to be the pivotal  voters in the centralised  system.
8  Note  that  this  is not  the  same  thing  as  saying  that
centralisation  makes  available  certain  redistributive  policies  that
did  not  exist before, though the  latter is certainly a  very
important  phenomenon.
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